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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY of 
REDDING PENNSYLVANIA and 
LARRY RIC HARDS SILVER, Adminis-
trator of the Estate of LYNN 
RIC HARDS SIL VER, Deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
EAGLE STAR INSURANCE COMPANY, 
LTD., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
14800 
This is a declaratory judgment action to determine whether Lynn 
Richards Silver was an omnibus insured under the aircraft hull and liability 
policy of appellant Eagle Star Insurance Company, or whether Silver's 
primary coverage was under the umbrella excess third party liability policy 
of respondent American Casualty Company. 
DISP0:-1ITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Motions for summary judgment were filed by both sides. 
Plaintiffs and respondents were granted summary judgment in the Third 
Tud1cial District, Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. presiding. 
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RILTCI' SOUG!IT ON /\PPI/\I. 
Dofcndont und appellant [aglc Steir Jnsur,rncc C'omrvrny socks 
rcv<:rsul of the summury judgmc~nt ,~rnd judgm<:nt in its fdvor dS u mutlc~r 
of law, or in the alternutivo, rcmund of the action for triill. 
STATEMENT or f/\CTS 
Lynn Richards Silver was piloting a Cessna 310 aircraft when it 
crashed on June 22, 1972, killing the pilot and his wife and the two other 
passengers. Vurious liability claims have been filod ago inst the estate 
of Lynn Richards Silver, C. W. Silver Company irnd Sileo Corporation, 
and this action was to determine which insurance company is obligc:ited 
to defend the estate of Lynn Richards Silver and pay any claims for 
which the estate is legally liable. 
The aircraft was owned by Sileo Corporation, i1 Salt Lake City 
company in the business of leasing and renting real and personal property. 
Sileo Corporation was the named insured in the Cagle Star hull and I iability 
policy on the subject aircraft. This insurance contract excludes coveruqe 
to any person operating the aircraft under the terms of any agreement 
which provides any remuneration for the use of said aircrilft, in the 
following language: 
"In consideration of the payment of the premium, in reliance 
upon the statements in the declarations made a part hereof 
and subject to the limits of liability, exclusions, conditions 
-2-
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and all other terms of this policy, agrees with named 
insured [Sileo Corporation] to afford those of the following 
coverages as are specified in the declarations: 
*** 
Coverage E -- Single Limit Bodily Injury (including 
passengers) and Property Damage Liability. 
To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which 
the insured shall become legally obligated to 
pay as damages because of bodily injury ••• 
including death at any time resulting therefrom, 
sustained by any person including passengers as 
defined herein, ••• caused by an occurrence 
and arising out of the ownership, maintenance, 
or use of the aircraft." 
Also, under the "Insuring Agreements" of the policy, the persons 
insured are limited as follows: 
"III. Persons Insured. 
The unqualified word 'insured' wherever used in this policy 
••• includes not only the named insured but also any person 
while using or riding in the aircraft... The insurance with 
respect to any person or organization other than the named 
insured does not apply to: 
*** (d) to any person operating the aircraft under the 
terms of any agreement which provides any remuneration 
for the use of said aircraft." 
Sileo Corporation had an agreement with C. W. Silver Company 
whereby C. W. Silver's employees used the aircraft in return for full 
payment by C. W. Silver Company of all costs of maintenance, repair, 
storage, operation, inspection, and license. (Deposition of Larry R. 
Silver, pp 0 28-29; Deposition of Roy R. Silver, p.35). 
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Larry R. Silver, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the C. w. 
Silver Company and a Director of Sileo Corporation, and Roy R. Silver, 
President and a Director of Sileo Corporation and a Director and Shareholder 
of C. W. Silver Company, testified in their depositions that both corporation 
considered this agreement a fair business arrangement. Sileo Corporation 
deemed the consideration it received to be a valuable benefit. 
"[The aircraft) is a valuable piece of equipment. It would 
cost us a lot to maintain that airplane when we weren't 
using it and they were doing all of that, which was a 
great expense." (Deposition of Larry R. Silver, p.47). 
At the time Sileo Corporation acquired the aircraft, there was an 
understanding between the two corporations that C. W. Silver Company 
would operate it and there would be "some kind of remuneration". (Depos itic 
of Roy R. Silver, pp.31-32). 
The two companies ire owned and operated by some of the same 
individuals. L~•nn Richards :-; ilver was the Manager of both companies and 
an officer and director of both companies. (Deposition of Roy R. Silver, 
pp.24-25). Nevertheless, this agreement governing use and payment 
for the aircraft was a bus in es s arrangement. The aircraft was initially 
acquired by S ilco Corporation not for the use of C. W. Silver Company 
but rather to discharge a debt owed by a third party. (Deposition of Roy 
R. Silver, pJ4). Sileo Corporation had rented or leased other equipment to 
-4-
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C. W. Silver Company from time to time under written lease contracts. 
Roy R. Silver, the President of S ilco, the corporation which owned the 
aircraft, was surprised that there was no written lease agreement binding 
C. W. Silver Company to Sileo for its use of the plane. (Deposition of 
Roy R. Silver, pp.41-42). At a Sileo Corporation directors' meeting, the 
possible sale of the aircraft was discussed: 
"Q. Did anyone mention the fact that C. W. Silver might not 
like the idea of selling the aircraft? 
A. Tough. What has C. W. Silver Company got to say about it?" 
(Deposition of Larry R. Silver, pp.47-48). 
At the time of the accident the aircraft was being operated by 
Lynn Richards Silver pursuant to the ongoing agreement between C. W. 
Silver Company and Sileo Corporation for exclusive use of the aircraft in 
return for payment of all costs of maintaining and operating it. (Deposition 
of Larry R. Silver, pp.38-42). The aircraft was never used for the business 
travel of Sileo Corporation and on the fatal trip it was not on Sileo 
Corporation's business. (Deposition of Roy R. Silver, pp.41-43). 
It is undisputed that at the time of the accident, respondent 
American Casualty Company had in force an umbrella excess liability policy 
which will provide primary coverage for the claims arising out of the 
accident in question if the policy of appellant Eagle Star is not applicable. 
-5-
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The liability coverage of each policy is one million dollars, and the 
American Casualty policy has a retained limit of ten thousand dollars. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT !. 
LYNN RICHARDS SILVER WAS NOT AN OMNIBUS INSURED 
UNDER THE EAGLE STAR POLICY WHEN OPERATING THE 
AIRCRAFT BECAUSE SUCH OPERATION WAS UNDER THE 
CONTINUING AGREEMENT BETWEEN STLCO CORPORATION 
AND C. W. SILVER COMPANY FOR THE USE OF THE 
AIRCRAFT IN EXCHANGE FOR REPAYMENT OF ALL EXPENSES, 
WHICH AMOUNTED TO "ANY AGREEMENT WHICH PROVIDES 
ANY REMUNERATION FOR THE USE OF SAID AIRCRAFT" 
UNDER THE POLICY LIMITATION OF PERSONS INSURED. 
It is a settled rule that terms of an insurance contract should be 
construed according to their clear meaning. Couch on Insurance 2d, § 15: 38; 
Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, § 73 86. Where a term is clear and 
unambiguous, the courts are obliged to give it effect. Marriot v. Pacific 
National Life Assurance Co., 24 Utah 2d 182, 467 P. 2d 981 (Utah ,1970). 
The ordinary meaning of the term "any agreement which provides 
any remuneration" includes the agreement for payment in this case. 
Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition Unabridged, 
gives this favored definition of "any": 
"One indifferently out of a number; one indiscriminately of 
whatever kind." 
This definition is consistent with the clear meaning of the word in this 
-6-
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context, to indicate that the Eagle Star Insurance does not extend to 
one operating the aircraft under [whatever kind] of agreement for '.whatever 
kind] of remuneration. 
The same authority defines "remuneration" as: 
"Recompense; pay. Synonyms: Payment, reimbursement, 
satisfaction." 
Likewise, the prefix "re-" is defined as denoting "back, especially back 
to an original or former state or position." These definitions reflect the clear 
meaning of these terms which include the facts of the instant case, where 
C. W. Silver Company agreed to pay or reimburse Sileo Corporation in 
return for exclusive use of the aircraft. The plain language of the 
insuring agreement should be enforced: "Any remuneration" means any, 
and the record is clear as to the important benefits conveyed to Sileo 
Corporation through this agreement. 
To strain the obvious meaning of "any agreement for any remuneration" 
in order to require, for example, a monetary profit, would subvert the plain 
language of the insurance contract. Where the officers and directors of 
Sileo Corporation itself regarded the benefit received from the agreement 
to be substantial in terms of meeting the costs of maintaining and preserving 
the airplane as a valuable as set, a court should not substitute its judgment 
of what may or may not be a sufficiently profitable payment in order to 
-7-
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constitute "any remuneration". Sileo Corporation, in its own financial 
best interest, agreed to accept remuneration for certain costs as considPratic 
for allowing C. W. Silver Company to use the airplane. Reasonable minds 
should agree that this agreement obviously is included in the concept of 
"any agreement for any remuneration." 
POINT II. 
OTHER COURTS INTERPRETING THE SAME OR SIMILAR 
INSURING AGREEMENTS HAVE FOUND THEM CLEAR 
AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND HAVE RULED AGAINST 
COVERAGE OF A PILOT OPERATING THE AIRCRAFT 
UNDER AN AGREEMENT FOR REMUNERATION. 
Melton v. Ranger Insurance Co., 515 S. W. 2d 3 71 (Tex .Ct. of C iv .ft. 
19 7 4) involved a fact situation very similar to the instant case. Ranger 
Insurance Company had issued an aviation liability policy to the owner of 
the aircraft, as the named insured. The owner had rented the aircraft to 
Donald Melton, who was piloting it when it ran out of gas and crashed, 
fatally injuring Melton and six passengers. Thereafter, the estates of 
the passengers sued the pilot's estate for damages. Although requested to 
do so, the Ranger Insurance Company refused to defend the Melton estate 
in that case. The plaintiffs obtained a judgment against the Melton estate 
and then filed this suit against the defendant Ranger Insurance Company, 
seeking to collect under the terms of the liability policy, the amount of 
the judgment they had obtained in the previous action against the fvlelton 
estate. 
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In addition to naming the owner of the aircraft as the named insured, 
the policy in question provided under "Insuring Agreements" that: 
"The unqualified word 'Insured' wherever used in this policy ••• 
includes not only the named insured but also any person 
while using or riding in the aircraft and any person or 
organization legally responsible for its use, provided the 
actual use is with the permission of the named insured. 
The provisions of this paragraph do not apply: 
*** 
(c) to any person operating the aircraft under the terms 
of any rental agreement or training program which provides 
any remuneration to the named insured for the use of said 
aircraft." [Emphasis added] 
Under the policy Declarations, the purposes of use of the aircraft 
were listed as "commercial", defined in part in the policy as permitting use 
for rental to pilots. 
The plaintiffs argued that since the provisions of the Declarations 
of the policy made rental to pilots a permitted use of the aircraft, an 
ambiguity was thereby created as to whether or not a renter pilot was an 
omnibus insured under the terms of the policy and that the court should 
construe the policy to mean that the renter pilot, Melton, was an omnibus 
insured at the time he crashed. 
The court found there was no ambiguity and affirmed summary 
judgment in favor of the Ranger Insurance Company and against the claimants. 
It observed that the policy clearly spells out who the insureds are, in 
-9-
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language that expressly excludes a person operating the aircraft 
under a rental agreement for remuneration. The effect of the "Purpose of 
Use" clause is to provide that the loss covered by the policy must arise 
out of certain named uses, one of which may be rental to pilots. This 
part of the policy mereiy makes it clear that the owner's coverage for 
its negligence as lessor not in possession of the plane is not forfeited by 
permitting a renter pilot to use the plane. 
"It is not the purpose or the effect of the Purposes of Use 
provisions of this policy to designate who is or who is not 
an insured under the policy. 
Nothing in the Purposes of Use prov1s1ons of the policy in any 
way modifies, even by implication, the definition of 'Insured' 
contained in the policy." 
In reaching its decision, the court applied the following well known 
and accepted rules of contract construction: 
"(a) Courts may only construe a contract of insurance as it 
was made; they are not authorized to make a new contract 
for the parties." 
"(b) Courts are without authority to needlessly reject any 
words or terms used in contracts of insurance by parties or 
delete any clause therein as surplusage, unless that action is 
judicially mandatory." 
"(c) An implication cannot be allowed to override an 
express provision of a contract." 
Jahrman v. Valley Air Park, Inc., 333 So.2d 712 (La.Ct.of App.1976' 
affirmed summary judgment dismissing the claim of coverage by a pilot 
-10-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
operating the aircraft under a rental agreement. The court held that 
the pilot was not an insured under the policy which provided that 
"insured" included any person while using the aircraft with parmission 
of the named insured except any person, other than the named insured, 
while the aircraft was subject to any lease agreement" The court found 
the language of this insuring agreement to be clear and unambiguous. 
It further observed: 
"One of the permitted uses of an aircraft under the policy 
is renta 1 to others. [The named insured] would be covered 
as to its liability but the person using the aircraft under 
a rental agreement would not be covered, The quoted 
provisions clearly state that they do not apply to any person, 
other than the named insured, while the aircraft is subject 
to any rental or lease." 333 So. 2d at 714, [Emphasis in 
original]. 
In denying coverage to the pilot, the court followed the rule of 
44 CJS "Insurance," § 290: 
"In the: absence of ambiguity, ••• it is the function of the 
court to construe and enforce the contract as written, 
even with respect to a restrictive provision ••• and 
regardless of whether it ••• works a hardship ••• " 
333 So. 2d 714. 
The reasoning of this decision is sound, It is submitted that this 
same result is indicated in the instant case, and perhaps more particularly 
where the instant case is not a situation where a putative insured risks 
being left without coverage for a loss. Rather, it is undisputed that in 
-11-
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the event the Eagle Star policy does not apply because of the 
appropriate exclusion, nevertheless the policy of American Casualty 
Company will be in full force as to the pilot Lynn Richards Silver. 
Buestad v. Ranger Insurance Co., 551 P.Zd 1033 (Wash.Ct. of App 
1976) again reversed summary judgment in favor of coverage to a pilot 
operating the aircraft under an agreement for remuneration, and entered 
judgment as a matter of law that there was no coverage as to the pilot. 
The pilot rented an airplane from the named insured to learn to fly, 
The "definition of insured" in the policy issued to the aircraft's owners 
extended to the named insured and permissive users, with an exception very 
similar to the policy language of the instant case: 
"The provisions of this paragraph do not apply: 
To any person operating the aircraft under the 
terms of any rental agreement or training program 
which provides any remuneration to the Named 
Insured for the use of said aircraft." 551 P.Zd at 
1034. 
The pilot was specifically excluded from being an insured because 
he was a person operating the aircraft under a rental agreement providing 
remuneration to the named insured. 
The Melton and the Buestad case both considered the claim of 
ambiguity between an Insuring Agreement limiting coverage to the named 
-12-
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insurnd where there is any rental agreement for remuneration, and a 
"Purpose of Use" description permitting rental of the aircraft to pilots, and 
in both cuses the courts held there was no ambiguity and coverage should 
be denied. In a line of cases interpreting the same alleged ambiguity, 
the Michigan Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion and found 
an ambiguity which was resolved in favor of extending coverage to the 
renter pilot. Martin v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 157 N.W.2d 827 (Mich. 
Ct. of App. 1968); Miller v. Ranger Ins, Co., 183 N.W.2d 621 (Mich.Ct. 
of Appo 1970). These Michigan cases are not authority for finding ambiguity 
in the instant rnse since they were decided on different "Purpose of Use" 
policy language. In the instant case, the Purpose of Use allowed in the 
Eagle Star policy is "pleasure and business", defined as "personal, pleasure, 
fomily and business uses excluding any operation for which a charge is 
made,". There is no such possible ambiguity between the definition of 
"insured" and the "Purpose of Use", as that which confronted the Michigan 
courts. Consequently, the Michigan cases should be read as implicitly 
supporting the limitation of coverage to the named insured where the aircraft 
is operated under the terms of an agreement for remuneration for its use, 
because the court only denied such limitation on the basis of an ambiguity 
with the broader provisions of the Purpose of Use clause. In the instant 
case, where there is no such possible ambiguity, the limitation of coverage 
to the nomed insured should be given effect. 
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POINT III. 
CASES TURNING ON WHETHER THE PURPOSE OF USE 
ALLOWED BY THE POLICY WAS VIOLATED BY AN OPERATION 
FOR WHICH A CHARGE WAS MADE ARE DECIDED ON 
COMPLETELY DIFFERENT ISSUES THAN THE INSTANT CASE. 
THEY ARE NOT AUTHORITY ON THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE. 
Several well reasoned opinions discuss whether an aviation policy 
declaration limiting the Purpose of Use of the aircraft to "uses excluding 
any operation for which a charge is made," is violated by payments of 
various amounts under various fact situations. These cases generally 
conclude that the intent of this limitation is to prevent profit-making use 
of the aircraft for hire, in a commercial context in arms-length transactions 
which would not have taken place but for the receipt of funds in exchange 
for use of the aircraft. None of these cases discuss the policy language 
on which appellant relies in the instant case, which limits coverage to 
the named insured where "any person operate[s] the aircraft under the 
terms of~agreement which provides ~emuneration for the use of said 
aircraft." (Emphasis added). This language is much broader than the 
exclusion for "operation for which a charge is made" as that term is 
discussed in the following cases, because the policy language on which 
appellant relies, expressly includes ~agreement for~ remuneration, 
regardless of whether the agreement is commercial or personal in nature, 
regardless of whether the remuneration was the motivating reason for 
making the flight, and regardless of the amount of remuneration with 
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respect to the operating costs or market rental value of the aircraft. 
l\ppellant submits that under the facts of the instant case, the exclusion 
for operation for which a charge is made could probably be met. 
Nevertheless, this is not the issue which is before the court, and cases 
turning on this issue should be distinguished. 
Those of the following cases which were decided in favor of 
coverage all involved a single lump sum contribution for a specific 
flight, or an hourly contribution for time in flight. By contrast, the 
agreement for repayment between Sileo Corporation and C. W. Silver 
Company involved neither a single incident of use nor a contribution for 
flight time. Rather, the business agreement was ongoing and all inclusive 
as to the costs of keeping, preserving, and operating the aircraft without 
regard to use on any given occasion, and in fact without regard to whether 
the plane was used or not. 
As the Melton case stated, supra, it is not the purpose or the 
effect of the purposes of use provisions to designate who is or who is not 
an insured under the policy. It is understandable and proper that courts 
should scrutinize very carefully any attempts to deny coverage on the basis 
of an alleged violation of the Purposes of Use contemplated in the insurance 
contract. Such a denial of coverage to the named insured would indeed be 
-15-
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an extreme measure. By contrast, the Melton, Buestad, and fahrman 
cases discussed supra, which refused to extend coverage to an alleged 
omnibus insured who does not meet the standards of the policy definitions 
of "Insured", are unanimous in holding that the named insured and the 
insurance company are free to contract between themselves as to the 
circumstances under which additional parties may or may not become insurec 
under the policy. In the instant case, Eagle Star does not question the 
coverage of the named insured, Sileo Corporation, nor the coverage of C. 
W. Silver Company as an "organization legally responsible" for the use 
of the aircraft. Eagle Star merely seeks to invoke an unambiguous provision 
of the Insuring Agreement which does not provide coverage to the pilot, 
Lynn Richards Silver. 
The following cases should be distinguished on this basis: 
In Thompson v. Ezzell, 379 P.2d 983 (Wash.1963), the exclusionar 
clause read: 
"Excluding any operation or flight for which a charge is made 
('share expense' flight shall not be considered as being made 
for a charge)." 
Ezzell rented the aircraft in question from a flying club of which he was a 
member, for the purpose of going on a trip with Thompson and their families. 
The estimated rental fee for the aircraft for the trip, including cost of fuel, 
was about $ 400. 00. Thompson gave Ezzell $ 3 7 5. 00 as a contribution toward 
-16-
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expenses, which would include plane rental and such other things as 
food and overnight accommodations. The court affirmed a summary 
judgment against the insurer which had sought to deny coverage to the 
named insured, holding the contribution by Thompson was a sharing of 
the expense, and not the payment of a charge. This case is important 
because the explicit exception of expense sharing arrangement from the 
exclusion for operation for which a charge is made, seems to have influenced 
subsequent courts interpreting the exclusion in policies where the expense 
sharing exception was not written. Significantly, the language upon 
whtch appellant relies in the instant case not only makes no exception 
for expense sharing, but to the contrary, carves a broad provision for 
·~remuneration." 
Houston fire & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ivens, 338 F.2d 452 (5th 
Cir. ,1964) involved an exclusion clause without the expense sharing 
exception. The insured pilot was going to fly the company's customer to 
pick up a part sold to the customer by the company. The pilot asked 
the company if it would pay $ 6 0. 00 for the gas for the six hour flight 
and the company agreed. The charger rate for this plane was about $40. 00 
per hour. The company president stated in his deposition that he had not 
agreed to contribute to the cost of the original trip, but merely for this 
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flight addition to the itinerary necessary to pick up the part. He 
specifically observed that he had not agreed to "help pay the expenses 
of the flight"; on the contrary, he stated, "I talked to [the pilot] about 
expenses and he never asked me for a nickel for expenses other than he 
asked me to contribute to gasoline only". No payment was ever made 
by the company or its president to anyone for gasoline used on the 
trip. 
The court held there was no charge. It stated: 
"It is the opinion of the court that when a charge is 
made for something, there is the distinct connotation 
that there is a quid pro quo. A charge may thus be 
considered as the price demanded for a thing or service. 
The agreement of [the company president] was merely 
the offer of a contribution made to help [the pilot] 
defray the cost of the gasoline.*** 
The proposed contribution ••• of $10. 00 an hour toward 
the cost of the gasoline was manifestly only a fractional 
part of the expenses of the flight, and fell far short of 
the applicable charter rates. 
The agreement • , • to contribute $ 6 0. 00 toward payment 
of the cost of the gasoline was a voluntary gesture ••• , 
based upon his feeling that this was the fair thing for 
the company to do •• , there was no obligation on the 
part of [the president] or on the part of the company to 
provide [the individual] with transportation." 
-18-
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The holding in this case is strongly persuasive that the contrary 
focts in the instant case should compel a contrary result. In the instant 
cusc, the arrungcment for remuneration of expenses was ongoing and all-
inclusive .. The agreement was not a gratuity by C. W. Silver Company to 
S ilco, but ruther a quid pro quo arrangement, as understood by both 
companies. Jn the instant case, both sides benefited materially from the 
remuneration agreement. 
fidelity & Casualty Co. of N .Y. v. Marion L. Crist & Associates, 
Inc., 455 S.W.2d (Ark.1970), held that whether $15.00 per hour paid to 
the insured owner of the aircraft by a prospective purchaser constituted a 
charye for the purpose of the aircraft policy exclusion, rather than a re-
imbursement for expense, was a jury issue where the evidence showed that 
the operating cost of the plane was $14. ll per hour and that a fair rental 
value of the aircraft was $15. 00 to $ 27. 5 0 per hour. The jury was within 
its discretion in finding this payment was a reimbursement for expenses. As 
a reimbursement, the court found that the payments did not invoke the policy 
exclusion for use for which a charge is made, even though there was no 
policy language to the effect that a reimbursement for expenses was not 
a prohibited charge, 
The court discussed the Ivens case at some length, and found it 
applicable in principle. Significantly, in this case the owner of the aircraft 
testified: 
-19 -
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"Q. Did you reach any agreement with [the pilot] to rent or 
charter the plane for him? 
A. No, I merely accepted his offer. 
Q. Did you make any demand for a particular rental price 
for the plane? 
A. No, he could have had it for nothing as far as we were 
concerned. " 
This testimony indicates the absence of a quid pro quo re lat ionshir 
such as the one in the instant case. 
Cammack v. Avemco Ins. Co., 505 P.2d 348 (Ore.1973) found 
the carrier attempting unsuccessfully to invoke the policy exclusion for 
operation for which a charge is made, where the plaintiff who owned the 
aircraft, permitted his uncle and cousin, both pilots, to fly the plane and 
they agreed to pay $10. 00 per flying hour, with plaintiff furnishing the 
gasoline. Plaintiff testified he agreed to the use of his plane for $10. 00 
per hour because of his relationship with his uncle, his permission to 
keep the plane at his uncle's air strip at no charge, friends hip, and his 
desire that the plane be used since long idleness was bad for the plane. 
Plaintiff computed that it cost him $ 27. 00 per flying hour. 
Under these facts, the court construed the transaction to be a 
payment of expenses in a "non-commercial context" and affirmed the trial 
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court that the pilot's permissive use was not "an operation for which a 
charge is made." 
In this case also, there was no policy language excepting an 
expense sharing arrangement from the exclusion for operation for which a 
charge is made. 
Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Ace! Delivery Service, Inc., 485 F.2d 
1169 (5th Cir. ,1973) again considered the circumstance of an insurer 
attempting to invoke the exclusion for operation for a charge. Here, the 
owner had assessed a $10.00 per hour fee over and above the cost of fuel 
and storage. Plaintiff contended that this was merely a sharing of expenses 
since it would barely cover the aircraft's maintenance and overhead expenses. 
Nevertheless, the court found that this was a charge within the policy 
exception excluding operations for which a charge was made. It held that 
the appropriate standard for determining whether a charge was made for use 
of the aircraft depends upon the motivating reasons for making the flight. 
The court held that this standard was consistent with the Ivens case, 
while the facts here compelled an opposite conclusion from Ivens. In this 
case, the owner of the aircraft testified that he expressly discussed with 
one of his colleagues the amount which was to be assessed to the pilot for 
his use of the aircraft, under circumstances which led the court to find a 
quid pro quo arrangement. 
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It is submitted that the facts of the instant case resemble Pacific 
Indemnity much more than Ivens, on the basis of the testimony as to the 
business relationship between Sileo Corporation and C. W. Silver Company, 
The Crist and the Cammack cases found that reimbursement for 
expenses was insufficient to constitute a charge for the operation of the 
aircraft, even though the policies in each case contained no exception whic 
would allow reimbursement for expenses o In both cases the court merely 
determined judicially that "operation for a charge" involved something more 
than reimbursement for expenses. Lest the court be tempted to reason alon~ 
similar lines in the instant case, it should be recalled that the language 
upon which appellant relies, appears in a completely separate part of the 
policy and would involve a radically different result, from the policy 
language considered in Crist and in Cammack, In fact, if a draftsman were 
to sit down to compose a contract provision designed to limit coverage 
to the named insured whenever the aircraft is operated under the terms 
of any agreement whatsoever, whether formal or informal, for any remun-
eration whatsoever, whether profit or reimbursement for expenses, and such 
a draftsman had before him the decisions of the Arkansas and Oregon courts 
in Crist and Cammack with their judicially imposed limitations on the meani: 
of "operation for a charge", such a draftsman could scarcely produce a 
contract provision which would better communicate his intent, than the 
-2~-
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one actually before the court in the instant case. 
POINT IV. 
BY THE UTJ\H STANDARD FOR DETERMINING WHETHER 
"COMPENSATION" IS PAID UNDER THE GUF.ST STATUTE, 
c. w. SILVER COMPANY MADE LEGALLY surrICIENT 
PAYMENTS TO SILCO CORPORATION TO THE EFFECT THAT 
LYNN RICHARDS SILVER IS NOT AN INSURED UNDER THE 
EAGLE STAR POLICY. 
The only Utah cases which discuss the sufficiency of consideration 
and tho circumstances of agreements concerning the payments of money and 
the receipt of carriage or use of an instrumentality of transportation, are 
the cases interpreting the Utah automobile guest statute, Utah Code 
Annotated 41-9-1, and the definition of "guest", 41-9-2. There is a 
companion aviation guest statute, Utah Code Annotated 2-1-33, which 
has not been the subject of judicial scrutiny on this particular point. The 
giving of compensation under the automobile guest statute has been explained 
by the Utah courts to require that compensation be given as the chief 
inducement for the carriage, regardless of whether close social or family 
relationships are also present. The central factor is that the parties 
deemed the consideration to be valuable, not whether there is an actual 
prof it. 
Jensen v 0 Mower, 4 Utah 2d 336, 294 P.2d 683 (1956): 
"As indicated in the language quoted from Am. Jur., the cases 
turn not on whether money is received or paid as a result of 
carrying the rider, but upon the fact that the money or other 
n? 
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consideration was given to the driver, not as a gratuity or 
in appreciation but rather as an inducement for making 
the trip for the rider or furnishing carriage for the ride. 
If the driver extends the courtesy of a ride to a friend 
without more or takes on a hiker overtaken on the highway, 
the status of guest in either case is not replaced by that 
of passenger if gas is purchased, meals purchased or cash 
given to assist the driver in meeting the ex pens es of the trip. 
Such rider is not in the car because of any compensation or 
payment which induced the driver to give the ride. That the 
driver has already done." 
Smithv. Franklin, 14Utah 2d 16, 376 P.2d 541 (1962): 
"It must be conceded that where it is shown that the rider 
is basically a social guest, neither the giving of just 'any 
compensation', which might be some inconsequential amount 
of money or other consideration of value, nor even the sharing 
of expenses, merely in social reciprocation for the ride, 
would change the relationship to that of passenger for hire. 
The phrase 'compensation therefor' as used in the statute 
means compensation for the ride. Therefore, it would have 
to be sufficient money (or other thing of value) that it reasonably 
could be supposed that the parties so regarded it. But whether 
there is profit in the transaction is obviously not the determining 
factor. When payment for the ride is the main inducement for 
it, the fact that there may also exist some social incentive 
which makes giving the ride enjoyable or desirable for the 
driver would not change its character to that of host and 
guest." (Emphasis added). 
This requirement that both parties must consider the compensation 
"sufficient" under the circumstances, is clearly met under the facts of the 
instant case, where both the C. W. Silver Company and Sileo Corporation 
received a material benefit from the remuneration agreement, namely, 
C. W. Silver Company could use the aircraft for its business purposes and 
-?4-
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Sileo Corporation received all expenses of the aircraft -- not just trip 
expenses but expenses that went on whether the plane flew or not, such 
as licensing, hangar, inspection, and safety maintenance, all of which 
wore necessary to preserve this valuable asset. The undisputed facts 
show that both sides of the agreement regarded its conditions as a fair 
bargain and exchange. There was remuneration for the operation of the 
aircraft, and under the policy definition of "Insured", anyone operating 
the plane when any remuneration is involved, by definition is not an 
insured and is not entitled to coverage under the policy: 
Under Utah law, the existence of close family or social interests 
between the bargaining parties is irrelevant to a finding that compensation 
was the chief inducement for carriage. Goff v. Goff, 53 5 P. 2d 6 81 (Utah, 
1975) found that plaintiff was a paying passenger where he gave his son 
$ 5. 00 to buy gas, and rode along in the son's car along with the son and 
other relatives, on a trip for the father's business purposes. 
Appellant Eagle Star submits that the policy language on which 
it relies in the instant case, embracing any agreement for any remuneration 
as discussed above, is much broader than the Utah guest statute. Never-
theless, if the court were to apply the guest statute standard of chief 
inducement for the carriage, to the facts of the instant case, Lynn Richards 
Silver would still be found to have been operating the aircraft under an 
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agreement for remuneration between C. W. Silver Company and Sileo 
Corporation. 
To the extent that the Utah guest cases suggest a useful concept, 
they should be considered by the court. However, as with the cases dealir 
with a "charge for use" of the aircraft discussed in Point III above, the Uta 
guest cases involved different policy inputs and contemplate different and 
harsher results than the policy language upon which defendant relies in 
the instant case. Likewise, the exact language employed is different: 
The reference to "any remuneration" in the Eagle Star policy should be read 
as a conscious attempt by the draftsman to avoid the narrower judicial 
interpretation placed on terms such as "charge" by the court in such cases 
as Crist and Cammack, and the word "compensation" under the guest 
statute, by the Utah Supreme Court. 
POINT V. 
IF THE COURT IS NOT DISPOSED TO RULE FOR APPELLANT 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE 
FACTS OF THIS CASE AMOUNT TO "ANY REMUNERATION" 
UNDER THE POLICY SHOULD BE DECIDED BY A TRIER OF 
FACT. 
Appellant submits that the undisputed material facts show that the 
aircraft crashed while being operated under an agreement for remuneration. 
If the court chooses not to rule in favor of appellant on this point, it 
should remand the action for trial on the question of whether the terms of 
_'/c.._ .. 
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the agreement were an "agreement for any remuneration." 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. The Insuring Agreement of the Eagle Star policy in question 
specifically limits coverage to exclude anyone operating the aircraft under 
the terms of any agreement which provides for any remuneration for the use 
of the aircraft. This limitation is consistent with the obvious purpose of 
the Insuring Agreement, to set forth who in fact are insured under the policy. 
Appellant Eagle Star does not question coverage as to the named insured, 
Sileo Corporation, nor to C. W. Silver Company. 
2. Employees of C. W. Silver Company operated the aircraft 
under an agreement for repayment to Sileo Corporation in the amount of 
charges for all operation expenses and upkeep, and the aircraft was 
operated pursuant to this agreement at the time of the accident. 
3. The ordinary meaning of "any agreement which provides any 
remuneration" includes the agreement in this case. 
4. The words used in the policy limitation on persons insured, 
are clear and unambiguous. Other courts considering the same and similar 
language have enforced the same provisions. 
5. In the event the liability of Lynn Richards Silver for this 
accident is properly held to be not covered under Eagle Star's policy, 
nevertheless the policy of respondent American Casualty Company will 
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remain in full force and effect und provide coverage to l.ynn R1churds 
Silver. 
6. The undisputed facts show that the payments by C. w. Silvc;r 
Company to Sileo Corporation were the motivating reuson and main 
inducement for allowing C. W. Silver Company to use the aircraft. Therc;-
fore, these facts meet the standard of exclusion for operation for which a 
charge is made, and the "compensation" standard of the Utah guest statute, 
although both of these standards require a harsher test than is properly 
indicated under the language of the policy in question. 
The relationship between C. W. Silver Company and Sileo 
Corporation in the agreement for use of the aircraft was a quid pro quo, 
where the two sides acted at arms-length and there was reciprocal exchange 
of consideration" Even though the two companies had interlocking 
directorates, nevertheless, S ilco intended to do what was best for it 
and any result to the detriment of C. W. Silver Company would be "tough" r 
the words of Larry Silver. His testimony indicates that the use of the plane 
was in return for all maintenance, rent, and upkeep, a significant expense. 
The plane was a valuable piece of property, and its proper maintenance was 
important consideration to Sileo' s business interests. The plane was 
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obtained by S ilco in the discharge of a debt, and it had intrinsic value 
which was maintained by C. W. Silver Company's expenditures. Sileo 
Corporation recognized that the preservation of this asset in top condition 
so that it could be more easily sold at a future time, at C. W. Silver 
Company's "great expense", was a valuable consideration. 
The judgment in favor of the plaintiff insurance company and 
pilot of the aircraft should be reversed and judgment entered on behalf 
of defendant that coverage did not exist under defendant's policy for the 
pilot Lynn Richard Silver at the time of the accident. 
Dated this // day of January, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG :!fi}fl/f'// 
By~----
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant 
6 04 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Appellant's Brief this ____ day of January, 1997, to 
H. Wayne Wadsworth, Hanson, Wadsworth & Russon, Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 702 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. 
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